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Target-Date Funds in 401(k) Retirement Plans  
 
Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus  
Individual responsibility for portfolio construction has long been central to defined 
contribution (DC) pensions in the United States, particularly in 401(k) retirement plans.1  The 
employer offering a 401(k) plan is responsible for selecting the plan’s menu of investment 
offerings, but employees retain ultimate responsibility for portfolio construction.  Nonetheless, 
an ongoing concern with such arrangements is that many participants seem ill-equipped to make 
such decisions, whether due to lack of financial sophistication or behavioral biases in decision-
making. 2   Over the past decade, one response to this concern in the retirement saving 
marketplace has been the introduction of investment offerings known as target-date funds 
(TDFs) in 401(k) plans. These funds aim to simplify employee investment decision-making and 
delegate important portfolio choices to investment managers selected by the employer.   
Target-date funds consist of a series of investment offerings with portfolio allocations 
described in terms of an expected year of retirement.  The funds are usually offered in five-year 
increments (e.g., a 2010, 2015, 2020, etc., fund); a typical series may include up to a dozen 
funds.  Participants making active choices can choose among these funds and other plan options; 
defaulted participants are invested by the employer in a single target-date fund based on 
employees’ current ages and assumed retirement dates. In what is often referred to as the “equity 
glide path,” equity allocations are highest for young participants farthest from retirement (e.g. the 
2050 fund) and lowest for those approaching and in retirement (e.g. a current-dated option such 
as the 2010 fund). Once a participant’s account is invested in a given target-date fund, his 
portfolio equity share is lowered over time due to age-related rebalancing by the fund manager 
(who also handles all other portfolio management decisions). Target-date funds have grown 
rapidly in the U.S.  From 2000 to 2010, assets rose from $6 to $245 billion, and 70% of DC plans 
                                                 
1 Here we use the term 401(k) plans to refer broadly to private-sector defined contribution plans which can include 
profit-sharing, money purchase, and 403(b) plans along with 401(k) plans. The importance of 401(k) plans in the 
retirement portfolio is discussed by Samwick and Skinner (2004). 
2 See Benartzi and Thaler (2001), Lusardi and Mitchell (2007, 2011), and Mottola and Utkus (2008) for extensive 
references.  
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offered target-date funds and 36% of all DC plan participants held positions in these funds (as of 
2010).3,4  
The growing use of target-date funds is influenced by two decision-making mechanisms. 
First, encouraged by qualified default investment alternative (QDIA) regulations issued by the 
U.S. Department of Labor in 2007, employers have added target-date funds to default 
arrangements including automatic enrollment, reenrollment, and fund mapping frameworks.5 In 
such settings, participant contributions are directly invested in a fund designated by the 
employer. Second, participants not subject to such default arrangements are also increasingly 
investing in the funds on their own.  In these active or voluntary choice settings, a participant’s 
selection of a target-date fund delegates portfolio construction tasks to the fund’s manager. 
Target-date funds offer three distinct portfolio features to investors, regardless of whether 
the funds are chosen actively or by default.  The first is a portfolio “prepackaging” or 
convenience feature, whereby contributions are directed to multi-asset class funds designed to be 
“all-in-one” portfolios. The second entails a current portfolio allocation with a decision heuristic 
based on the participant’s expected retirement age. This heuristic is arguably simpler than the 
process of creating a portfolio from a list of individual equity, fixed income, and/or balanced 
funds. A third feature is an age-based rebalancing service, whereby risk exposure is reduced 
automatically over time by the fund manager. The rebalancing can be viewed as a form of 
commitment device: with a current-day decision to invest in a target-date fund, the employee is 
committed to a future portfolio risk-reduction strategy, implemented by the fund manager, which 
the participant might otherwise fail to implement on his own.  
                                                 
3 See ICI (2011), Figures 7.8 and 7.22, and Holden, VanDerhei, Alonso and Bass (2011), Figure 22.  Target-date 
funds accounted for an estimated 10 percent of private DC plan assets in 2009.  Total target-date fund assets, 
including monies in DC plans, IRAs and elsewhere, grew from $9 billion in 2000 to $340 billion in 2010 (ICI, 
2011).  These data are based on mutual fund assets and do not include the growing pool of target-date assets 
invested in collective trusts or commingled funds, used by larger retirement plans.  In 2010 68% of DC participants 
were offered target-date funds, and 53% of those offered invested in them (Holden et al., 2011). See also Vanguard 
(2011) and Copeland (2011) for additional information on target-date fund adoption. 
4 For other studies on target-date funds, see Agnew, Szykman, Utkus and Young (2011); Ameriks, Hamilton and 
Ren (2011); Pagliaro and Utkus (2011); and Park (2009).   
5 Eligible QDIAs under the 2006 Pension Protection Act include target-date funds, traditional balanced funds, and 
managed account advice services.  When a plan sponsor defaults a participant to a QDIA and follows regulatory 
requirements for, among other items, notification and disclosure to participants, and offers a pre-emptive right for 
participants to “opt out” to alternative investments, the sponsor receives so-called 404(c) protection for participant 
portfolio choices, meaning there is a presumption that the employer is not liable for participant portfolio decisions 
when they invest in the QDIAs.  Irrespective of this fiduciary protection, the sponsor, as with all plan investments, 
retains fiduciary liability for selecting and monitoring the QDIA itself. 
3 
 
 
We seek to evaluate how the introduction of target-date funds influences patterns of both 
adoption and portfolio construction within 401(k) plans. We draw on a longitudinal dataset from 
a major 401(k) plan provider, which offers a unique natural experiment in which to observe the 
funds’ evolution over the 2003-10 period. Target-date funds were available in our dataset to 
more than two million participants in over one thousand DC plans by 2010. The longitudinal 
nature of the dataset permits us to examine the complex dynamics of target-date behaviors over 
time, including the distinct reactions of existing employees versus new hires to the funds’ 
introduction, and the effect of changing employer default policies.  In the first part of the paper 
we consider adoption patterns: who adopted the funds, whether they adopted them as a single 
holding (“pure investors”) or combined them with other options (“mixed investors”), and how 
default arrangements versus voluntary choice influenced adoption results.  In the second part of 
our paper, we consider changes in participant portfolios when target-date funds are adopted 
voluntarily.  For this analysis, we consider participants who actively switched to the new funds 
when the funds are first introduced.  This difference-in-difference analysis permits us to isolate 
the treatment effects of target-date funds on portfolio composition, controlling for both observed 
and unobserved differences in target-date investors.  
We offer several new findings. First, we document the rising demand for target-date 
funds among participants due to active choice, particularly among workers early in the lifecycle  
Employees who make active choices are equally likely to use target-date funds as pure target-
date investors, or in combination with other funds as a mixed target-date investors; this suggests 
that preferences for target-date features are not a binary, all-or-nothing, choice. Also, voluntary 
adoption of target-date funds appears relatively invariant to market conditions over time and rose 
slightly during the recent financial crisis.   
Second, we show that a complex, default-based “choice architecture” is accelerating 
demand for target-date funds, and it is an important way in which the responsibility for portfolio 
choice transfers from workers to employers.6  Consistent with prior research (e.g. Madrian and 
Shea, 2001), automatic enrollment of new plan entrants into target-date funds raises adoption 
rates by 81 percent relative to adoption rates among non-defaulted workers. Yet other default-
based strategies adopted by employers can also have important—and sometimes even stronger 
                                                 
6 The term “choice architecture” was popularized by Thaler and Sunstein (2008) for a wide range of decision 
settings, including the retirement or pension plan context. 
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effects—on outcomes. For instance, the simple designation of a target-date fund series as the 
default for administrative recordkeeping purposes raises adoption among new hires by a relative 
55 percent—what we refer to as a “halo” effect just from the simple default assignment.  
Moreover, when an employer re-enrolls participants from a prior default fund into a new target-
date default, adoption rises by a relative 71 percent; when discontinued funds are mapped into 
target-date funds, target date fund adoption grows by a relative 166 percent.  
Third, we demonstrate that the portfolios of participants who select target-date funds 
when they are first offered undergo important changes upon adoption, suggesting that the funds 
serve as a form of implicit investment advice for workers. 7   This implicit advice feature 
represents a second mechanism by which responsibility for 401(k) portfolio selection is shifting 
from workers to employers. Portfolio changes are most dramatic for pure (single-fund) target-
date investors: the difference in equity share between the youngest and oldest participants widens 
by over 40 percent points. Younger participants can anticipate large increases in portfolio returns 
and variances, and all investors can expect to benefit from sizeable reductions in nonsystematic 
risk (the target-date funds in our sample are index-based).  It is worth noting that participants 
could have pursued these investment changes on their own but did not; they occurred only as a 
result of the employer’s decision to introduce target-date funds to the plan menu.  This finding, 
along with our results on default effects, confirm that preferences around retirement portfolios 
are rather malleable: many participants are accept third-party direction of their portfolios, either 
by default or via simplified choice.   
Following a brief overview of related research, we describe the complex decision-making 
architecture involved in the introduction of target-date funds to 401(k) plans. We then develop 
empirical models of target date adoption, followed by a difference-in-difference analysis of 
portfolio changes for a sample of participants adopting target-date funds when first offered.  We 
conclude with a discussion of implications of findings for retirement policy and household 
financial decision-making.   
  
                                                 
7 The term “advice” has specific legal meaning under employee benefit law.  Here we use the term “advice” in a 
practical sense, meaning reliance by the participant on the target-date fund as a portfolio choice.   
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Related Prior Research 
The concept of “choice architecture” refers broadly to the design of the decision 
framework governing consumer choice (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). Behavioral elements of 
decision-making in the retirement setting, such as the role of default arrangements for saving and 
portfolio decisions, the impacts of inertia and procrastination, and the difficulty decision-makers 
have with complex choice sets, are all related to this concept.  In our context, it is highly relevant 
to an analysis of the impact of default investment designations in retirement plans, as well as the 
simplifying decision heuristic associated with choosing target-date funds. 
Several prior studies have examined how defaults influence workers’ saving decisions 
(c.f. Carroll, Choi, Laibson, Madrian and Metrick, 2009; Choi, Laibson, and Madrian, 2004; 
Choi, Laibson, Madrian, and Metrick, 2003, 2006; Nessmith, Utkus and Young, 2007).  Others 
explore how defaults affect portfolio allocation and trading choices in retirement plans and 
personal saving accounts (c.f. Agnew, Balduzzi and Sunden, 2003; Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004; 
Benartzi, 2001; Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002; Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler, 2007; Calvet, 
Campbell, and Sodini, 2009; Mitchell, Mottola, Utkus and Yamaguchi, 2006a, 2006b; 
O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999; 2001). Our research is most closely related to studies showing 
that retirement plan investment menus can shape, or “frame,” individual portfolio allocation 
patterns due to inertia or naïveté (c.f. Benartzi and Thaler, 2001, 2002; Huberman and Jiang, 
2006; Brown, Liang and Weisbenner, 2007; Thaler and Sunstein, 2008; and Tang, Mitchell, 
Mottola, and Utkus, 2010), or in reaction to excessive complexity (also known as “choice 
overload;” c.f. Iyengar, Huberman, and Jiang, 2004; Iyengar and Kamenica, 2010).  There is also 
a related literature on whether participants making portfolio choices make investment errors, due 
to investment illiteracy or behavioral biases (c.f. Barber and Odean 2001; Benartzi and Thaler, 
2001, 2002; Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007, 2011; Mottola and Utkus, 2008; Mitchell and Lusardi, 
2011).   
 In what follows, we examine two aspects of choice architecture in the retirement saving 
context, namely the effect of default investment designations on 401(k) portfolio choice, 
encouraged by federal regulatory policy under the Pension Protection Act and implemented over 
the past decade by employers in 401(k) plans; and the simplifying choice mechanism embedded 
in target-date funds, whereby portfolio selection is reduced to the choice of an expected 
retirement age.   
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401(k) Plan Menus and Participant Portfolios 
  Our analysis draws on data for employers sponsoring 401(k) plans who introduced target-
date funds over the period 2003-10.  The data are derived from the Vanguard 401(k) 
recordkeeping system, and the target-date funds offered were Vanguard-designed target-date 
funds.  Table 1, Panel A, shows the range of target-date funds arrayed  by their target maturity 
dates; each involves a different mix of passively-managed U.S. equity (including large-, mid- 
and small-capitalization stocks), international equity (both developed and emerging markets), 
and U.S. high-quality bonds. As of December 2010, for instance, total equity exposure in the 
funds for younger participants averaged 90 percent (in the 2040 through 2055 Funds) versus 29 
percent for older participants in the Income Fund (intended for retirees).8  
Table 1 here 
Target-date funds have often been selected by employers as a replacement for (or in 
addition to) so-called “static allocation” or risk-based asset allocation funds; the latter are pre-
packaged investment offerings where portfolios differ solely based on equity fractions with no 
implied age glide path.9  Panel B of Table 1 outlines how our 401(k) plans added target-date 
funds over time, conditional on having had pre-existing static allocation offerings.  In 47 percent 
of the plans, target-date funds were introduced de novo, while in the remaining 53 percent of the 
plans, participants had been previously offered static allocation funds. In the latter group, one set 
of firms added target-date funds to a menu that included pre-existing static allocation funds, 
while another set switched or “mapped” existing participant accounts from static allocation to 
target-date funds.10  Controlling on the prior presence of static allocation funds is important, as it 
helps identify groups of employees with a taste for portfolio “prepackaging,” albeit without the 
age-based equity glide path inherent in target-date funds.   
                                                 
8 The Vanguard funds are all indexed except for holdings of inflation-indexed bonds, which materially affect only a 
small fraction of the portfolios of participants in retirement; accordingly we refer to the funds as indexed.  Fees for 
the funds were below 0.20% during the 2003-10 period; at the end of our analysis period, even lower-cost versions 
of the target-date funds were introduced in certain large plans. During 2010 some target-date funds offered by other 
investment managers were introduced into the sample, but they account for less than 1% of sample participants. 
9 When static allocation funds are offered, participants are presented with a selection of three or more funds of 
varying risk profiles (such as conservative, moderate, or aggressive).  There is no age-based rebalancing.  Defaulted 
participants are typically allocated to a moderate- or low-risk portfolio at the employer’s direction. 
10 In the case of mapping from static allocation to target-date funds, sponsors can either switch all participant static 
allocation balances and contributions into the new funds, or allow existing balances to remain undisturbed while 
switching future contributions into the new funds.  In both cases, the new target-date allocations reflect the sponsor’s 
decision to move the money, rather than representing an active employee election.   
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To analyze adoption behavior, we developed a panel of 401(k) plans over the 2003-10 
period which introduced target-date funds. By December 2010, the sample included 1,008 plans 
offering target-date funds covering more than 1.8 million active participants.11  Importantly, we 
only include plans for which we observe plan and participant records both prior to and 
subsequent to the introduction of the target-date funds.12  We included all participants entering 
and leaving the plans due to normal workforce turnover, so the number of participants totaled 
over 2.2 million.  Participants were observed monthly, so the total number of observations was 
62.5 million.  
The dataset includes several variables relevant to whether participants selected a target-
date fund actively or were defaulted to it through one or more means, as described in more detail 
below. Participant demographic information includes 401(k) account balances, investment 
holdings, and contribution patterns, as well as key socioeconomic characteristics including age, 
sex, household income, job tenure, and non-retirement financial wealth.13 We also have features 
pertinent to plans’ investment menus offered, including the number and types of investment 
funds along with other plan design details such as the availability of plan loans or employer 
stock.  Our dataset includes monthly returns for all investments offered over a 13-year period 
(including the eight-year period under analysis as well as the preceding five years).   
Table 2 summarizes characteristics of the plans and participants.14  Four variables capture 
aspects of the default architecture (Column 1).  The variable Default indicates, at the plan level, 
whether the target-date series was designated as the plan’s default option; around 80 percent of 
participants were in plans where target-date funds were thus designated. A second default 
architecture variable, New-hire auto enrollment, indicates whether new hire automatic 
enrollment was a plan feature, regardless of the type of default fund used by the plan.15  Over 48 
                                                 
11 Active 401(k) participants are those who are currently contributing to their employer’s retirement plan.  
12 Plans transferring to the Vanguard recordkeeping service for the first time during our sample period and adopting 
target-date funds at that point are not included in our sample because we cannot observe plan holdings prior to the 
funds’ introduction. 
13  Household income and non-retirement wealth are provided by Acxiom; non-retirement wealth amounts are 
imputed using zip code (zip+4) averages.   
14 The Online Appendix describes dataset characteristics by year and overall. 
15 Under new-hire automatic enrollment, newly eligible participants have contributions deducted automatically from 
their first eligible pay (with the right to opt out); their contributions are invested in the plan’s designated default 
fund.  Our automatic enrollment indicator is for new hires only.  Some employers have returned to “sweep” (i.e., 
automatically enroll) existing eligible non-participants. But because our dataset did not include an indicator for such 
“sweeps,” any automatic enrollment estimate should be viewed as a lower bound of the actual figure.   
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percent of participants were in plans where new hires were automatically enrolled.  In total, 19 
percent of participants were automatically enrolled as new hires—in other words, as employees 
who joined plans under new-hire automatic enrollment (not shown in Table 2).  
Table 2 here 
Reenrollment, the third default variable, indicates at the participant level whether 
participants were invested in a prior default fund and automatically switched by the employer to 
a new default. Although reenrollment as a plan design strategy can be used in a variety of 
settings, we consider it only in the case of a sponsor-directed change in default funds.16,17  One 
and one-half percent of our participant sample underwent a default fund reenrollment during the 
period. A fourth default variable is Mapping, relevant when an employer discontinued a fund 
option in the plan (perhaps because the employer as fiduciary no longer deemed the fund 
appropriate). The Mapping variable indicates that a participant was automatically shifted from a 
closing fund to the plan’s newly designated default option.18  In our sample, just over four 
percent of participants saw one or more funds discontinued and all or part of contributions 
transferred to a new default fund.   
In terms of target-date portfolio behavior, 41 percent of participants in the full sample 
(nearly 912,000 individuals) adopted or were defaulted to target-date funds between 2003 and 
2010 (Table 2, Column 1). To define target-date fund adoption, we focus on total contributions 
(employer and employee) to target-date funds, since contributions are most reflective of 
participants’ forward-looking intentions and are unbiased by past asset holdings.  Almost 30 
percent of participants were “pure” target-date fund (TDF) investors, meaning that all 
contributions were directed to a single target-date fund. The remaining 12 percent of cases were 
of the “mixed” target-date fund sort, meaning that these employees contributed to a target-date 
                                                 
16Reenrollment refers to the process of switching participant assets and contributions to a newly-designated qualified 
default investment alternative (QDIA), such as a target-date fund.  Under federal regulations, participants are given 
prior notice that their assets and contributions are to be transferred to the newly designated default fund and given 
the right to make an alternative investment election.  Reenrollments are typically undertaken upon recordkeeper 
change, a change in the investment menu, or a change in defaults, although sponsors may undertake reenrollments 
purely to improve portfolio diversification within the plan.  See Vanguard (2008) and Mottola and Utkus (2009).  
17 While we do not have a specific indicator for default fund reenrollments, we estimate this from the time series 
data using two rules: (1) an employer changes the default at a given time t, and (2) within t + 6 months, all 
participant contributions change from the prior to the new default. 
18 We use the term “mapping” in a generic rather than legal sense.  In a legal sense, “mapping” refers to the rules 
governing the transfer of assets from a discontinued fund option into a new, “like” investment option.  We use the 
term “mapping” as it is used colloquially—to refer to the transfer of the discontinued fund’s assets into the plan’s 
designated default option.  
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fund along with other funds.19  In other words, measured by total contributions, the ratio of pure 
to mixed target-date investors was 2.5:1. Pure target-date fund investors were generally younger, 
more female, and had low/moderate incomes and lower balances (Table 2, Column 2). Mixed 
target-date fund investors had the opposite characteristics and above-average balances (Table 2, 
Column 3).  A point worth special note is that 42 percent of the sample was classified as “new 
entrants.”  As noted above, a plan entered our sample in the month it added target-date funds, at 
which point all then-current participants were classified as “existing.” A “new entrant” was 
anyone who entered a 401(k) plan with target-date funds included in the menu.20  
For the difference-in-difference (D-D) analysis (described in more detail below), we 
consider participants who voluntarily switched to a target-date investment for all or part of their 
portfolios within subsequent six months of the funds’ first appearance in the 401(k) plan.21  
These participants were subject to new target-date offerings by their employers and responded to 
that offering – or “treatment” – affirmatively within the subsequent six-month period. In effect, 
these participants can be thought of as workers with the strongest latent demand for target-date 
funds, as they switched to the funds within six months of the funds’ introduction. Over 163,000 
participants appear in the D-D sample: 69,148 were pure target-date investors (participants who 
switched from other holdings to a single target-date fund), and 94,288 were mixed target-date 
investors (participants who added a position in a target-date fund to their other investments). 
When compared to the full sample (Table 2, Columns 1 and 4), the D-D sample is quite similar 
to the full group.   
 
Factors Influencing Participant Target-Date Fund Adoption  
 When a participant adopts a target-date fund, the decision may be an active choice, not 
influenced by employer-designated defaults, or it can involve an employer-designated default.  In 
the former instance, no default designation is made; the plan sponsor thus may add target-date 
funds to the menu in anticipation of (or in response to) a perceived participant need for 
                                                 
19 A small fraction of this group contributed to multiple target-date funds and/or multiple plan options. Also, some 
mixed investors were “mixed” due to employer direction of employer contributions to company stock; we control 
for this effect with an indicator for employer securities in the plan investment menu. 
20 Not all new entrants are new hires.  Many of the plans in our sample allow immediate eligibility for the plan to 
new hires, though a minority imposes a six- or 12-month waiting period.   
21 We include only those plans introducing target-date funds by June 2010 in order to observe both pre- and post-
introduction effects for all observations. 
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prepackaged convenience, the simplifying decision heuristic of target-date funds or the age-
based rebalancing commitment device. Existing participants may reconsider their existing 
portfolio choices in light of the new investment features introduced with target-date funds; new 
entrants will evaluate the target-date offerings along with other funds when they enroll in their 
plans. In the latter instance, where employers establish a default architecture, target-date funds 
may be selected as defaults via several channels: as a default for administrative purposes, for 
new-hire automatic enrollment, for reenrollment from a prior default fund, or for “mapping” of 
discontinued fund options.  
 To assess the distinct impacts of defaults and active choice on participant portfolio 
selection, we estimate three multivariate models of target-date fund adoption. Each relates a 
distinct measure of target-date adoption to default, participant, plan, and market characteristics, 
as in equation (1):  
REARCHITECTUβPLANTPARTICIPANTDFAdopter tji γα ++=,,  
, ,i t j i j tυ τ ω ε+ + + +        (1) 
Here TDFAdopteri,j,t indicates whether individual i adopts a target-date fund (TDF) in plan j in 
month t, measured using total contributions to target-date funds (employer and employee).  In 
Model A, we use a Probit specification where the dependent variable takes a value of 1 if the 
participant contributes to a target-date fund in month t (0 otherwise). The mean value of this 
time-weighted adoption rate is 31.2 percent over the 2003-10 period.  Model B uses OLS and the 
dependent variable is the fraction of total contributions directed to the target-date fund; the mean 
time-weighted value for our sample is 24.1 percent. 22  Model C uses a multinomial Logit 
framework where the dependent variable is equal to zero if the participant is a non-target-date 
investor (the reference category); 1 if the participant is a “mixed” target-date fund investor 
(directing 1-99 percent of contributions to one or more target-date funds); or 2 if the participant 
is a “pure” target-date fund investor (directing all contributions to a single target-date fund).  In 
Model C, the mean time-weighted proportion of pure investors is 20.1 percent; of mixed 
investors, 11.1 percent.  For all three models we use the full sample described in Table 2 that 
includes all active participants in the 401(k) sample; this encompasses both existing participants 
                                                 
22 This figure includes both those holding target-date funds and those with zero holdings. 
11 
 
 
(those in the plan prior to the arrival of target-date funds), and new entrants (those appearing in 
the plan after the funds’ appearance).   
Explanatory variables in equation (1) include a PARTICIPANT term which controls on a 
New Entrant identifier (indicating whether a participant entered a plan since the plan began 
offering target-date funds). We also take into account participant socioeconomic characteristics 
including age, income, sex, job tenure, and non-retirement financial wealth. The 
ARCHITECTURE vector measures aspects associated with how target-date fund funds were 
introduced, including the Default, New-hire automatic enrollment, Reenrollment and Mapping 
variables described above. The three-way interaction, Default*New_hire auto enrollment 
*New_entrant, indicates that a plan had new-hire automatic enrollment and also used a target-
date fund as the designated default investment.  In addition, we control on the number of months 
since target-date funds were introduced, Months since target-date fund (and that same variable 
squared and scaled by 1,000), to trace out the time path of impact of target-date fund adoption.  
To account for cross-plan differences, the PLAN vector indicates the number of fund choices on 
offer, a variable indicating whether company stock was available in the 401(k) plan, and an 
indicator of loan availability. For reasons noted above, we also control on SA_Before which 
indicates whether static allocation funds were previously offered; this serves as an indicator of 
employee taste for prepackaged investment portfolios.23   Finally, all models include a control 
for the financial crisis, defined here as the period September 2008-June 2009. 
 Table 3 reports coefficient estimates and/or marginal effects for the three models 
summarized by equation (1), while Table 4 offers predicted effects for the five distinct decision-
making environments in which portfolio selection and target-date fund choices were made. The 
first set of results in Table 4 focuses on active choices absent any default fund designations; the 
four remaining options present other default configurations. The baseline measures are the 
effects associated with active choice by non-defaulted participants (Table 4, Panel I); these are 
the first available estimates of target-date adoption behavior independent of default effects. 
During the 2003-10 period, new entrants (entering plans with target-date funds already on the 
menu) had a predicted target-date adoption rate of 31.4 percent. Existing participants (in the plan 
                                                 
23 The econometric models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( iν ), time fixed effects ( tτ ), and industry 
fixed effects, along with missing data dummies.  
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when target-date funds first appeared) had a predicted target-date adoption rate of less than half 
that level, at 14 percent.   
The difference between new entrants and existing employees may be due to employer 
outreach surrounding the menu change: when new funds are added to a plan lineup, the change is 
often communicated in a brief announcement, while plan enrollment decisions generally receive 
a more detailed communications effort. It might also be the result of relative inattentiveness or 
inertia among existing employees, or the greater salience or novelty of plan features like target-
date funds to new plan entrants.  The process of actively choosing target-date funds also 
produces a roughly equal number of pure versus mixed investors. This suggests that preferences 
are not binary for the prepackaging, simplified choice or age-based rebalancing features of 
target-date funds (Panel I, Columns 3 and 4).  That is, the relative demand for these features is 
weaker for certain investors compared to others, so that for some, target-date funds represent 
only part of the endogenous portfolio selection process.24  
Tables 3 and 4 here  
Some of the strongest estimated effects in Table 4 are those associated with the default 
architecture of target-date funds. When employers designated target-date funds as the default but 
did not automatically enroll workers into the funds, the result was higher adoption rates (Table 4, 
Panel II).  Among new entrants, for instance, adoption increased by over half (49 versus 31 
percent), and for existing employees by more than one-third (19 versus 14 percent).  This is, in 
effect, a “halo” default effect associated with the employer’s designation of the funds as a default 
for administrative purposes only.  Several possible mechanisms might drive this “halo” default 
effect. First, when target-date funds were a designated default, the employer may have devoted 
greater effort or resources to communicating the funds to participants. Second, some sponsors 
present their large fund menus in logical grouping known as “tiers;” in such arrangements, the 
default target-date funds are usually in the first tier or grouping.  Thirdly, enrolling participants 
may have contacted the fund call center where an associate noted the tiering or the plan’s default 
funds; this information might then serve as an anchoring device in a conversation about portfolio 
                                                 
24  Both Agnew et al. (2011) and Ameriks et al. (2011) find evidence that some participants choose a mixed strategy 
in an effort to enhance diversification, even though the target-date funds are highly diversified multi-asset-class 
funds.  This view may reflect a naïve understanding of diversification or a distrust of a single fund manager and a 
desire to diversify among multiple managers. 
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choice. 25  Finally, the difference might represent an endogenous preference for age-based 
investing among employers that selected target-date funds as a default, taking into account 
workforce preferences or needs.  
As expected, the most well-known use of a default, namely automatic enrollment of new 
hires, did have a substantial effect on increased adoption of target-date funds (Table 4, Panel III).  
The predicted adoption rate from new-hire automatic enrollment into a target-date fund was 57 
percent, almost twice as large as the organic adoption rate of 31 percent among new entrants 
voluntarily electing target-date funds. A notable feature, not previously noted, of automatic 
enrollment is the tendency to produce nearly three times as many pure single-fund investors as 
mixed (48 versus 17 percent).  But even among those automatically enrolled, the demand for a 
single-fund portfolio was far from universal; among some participants, a more complex portfolio 
remained attractive. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, employers who re-enrolled workers from a previous default 
fund into the target-date saw as large a relative change as for automatic enrollment (Table 4, 
Panel IV).  New entrants were 71 percent more likely to adopt target-date funds as a result of 
default fund reenrollment (54 versus 31 percent), and existing employees, over twice as likely 
(31 versus 14 percent). Default fund reenrollments also raised pure adoption by a factor of 10, 
relative to mixed adoption (predicted adoption of 66 percent for pure investors versus six percent 
for mixed investors).  Employer mapping of discontinued funds into a target-date series also had 
a potent effect on adoption rates (Table 4, Panel V): new entrants had a predicted adoption rate 
of 84 percent and existing employees 65 percent.  Both outcomes imply substantial inertia with 
respect to default effects from fund mapping. The relative difference between the two groups 
likely reflects the increased familiarity of new entrants with target-date funds, and thus a reduced 
willingness to “opt out” of fund mapping.  Meanwhile, among existing employees, the predicted 
probability of being a mixed target-date fund investor was 55 percent versus 26 percent for being 
a pure target-date fund investor.  This is likely because participants holding the discontinued 
fund had multiple asset holdings, which combined with the new target-date fund creates a mixed 
target-date strategy.   
                                                 
25 Around three-quarters of Vanguard participants enroll online and one-quarter enroll by phone. Service associates 
have access to information on fund tiering and on the plan’s designated default, making this a plausible mechanism 
for some participants.  While service associates do not provide specific investment advice, the default fund may still 
serve as a reference point in portfolio allocation discussions. 
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Though the default architecture clearly had a major influence on target-date adoption and 
is hence our main focus here, other factors are also worth noting. In Table 3, target-date adoption 
was highest among low-balance participants and it fell with rising balances.  Younger 
participants (under age 35) were more likely to adopt target-date funds, either as pure or mixed 
investors.  These factors suggest that workers in the earlier stages of the investment lifecycle 
with less financial sophistication were more attracted to target-date funds, independent of the 
default architecture effects.  Another point worth noting is that target-date fund adoption rose 
during the financial crisis period after controlling for default effects.  This increased taste for 
target-date funds during the financial crisis represented active participant choice at a somewhat 
higher rate than in prior or subsequent periods.  
Two other subtleties are associated with the introduction of target-date funds into a plan 
menu.  As indicated by the coefficient on the Months since target-date fund variable and its 
square in Table 3, target-date fund adoption evolved nonlinearly over time: each month after the 
funds’ introduction saw adoption rates rise by 0.6 percentage points (though at a declining rate). 
This represents a pure time effect associated with the first appearance of the funds in a plan 
menu, and it implies a declining impulse function. Furthermore, offering more funds in the 
401(k) menu slightly dampened target-date fund adoption, and the effect was sizeable. Having 
ten additional funds in the menu was associated with a five percent point reduction in the 
probability of adopting target-date funds, suggesting that the appeal of target-date funds depends 
on the breadth of the other investment offerings on the menu.   
 
Treatment Effects of Target-Date Fund Introduction  
We next consider worker demand for the unique portfolio features of target-date funds, 
which, as noted earlier, include the prepackaged convenience element, an initial allocation based 
on a simplifying decision heuristic (expected age of retirement), and a portfolio commitment 
device for future age-based equity share rebalancing.  For this purpose, we use a difference-in-
difference treatment effects model, exploiting the longitudinal nature of our panel.  We select 
participants observed both one month prior to the introduction of target-date funds to the plan 
menu (the pre-treatment portfolio), and then again six months afterward (the post-treatment 
portfolio). We consider portfolio changes separately for those who became either pure or mixed 
target-date investors, and we control on elements of the default architecture to isolate the effects 
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of active participant choice. Importantly, we have a natural way to control for tastes for 
prepackaged investment portfolios, namely with the SA_before variable, which indicates whether 
static allocation funds had been offered previously.  As a result, the resulting demand for target-
date funds reflects a preference for the simplified current allocation heuristic (expected 
retirement age), the future rebalancing feature, or both.   
Table 5 presents investment attributes of pure and mixed target-date fund investor 
portfolios before and after target-date funds entered the menu.  Panel A shows the allocation of 
total employer and employee contributions by major asset class including cash or principal-
guaranteed funds (money market or guaranteed investment contracts), bonds, balanced or target-
date funds (including traditional balanced funds and static allocation funds), U.S. equities, 
international equities, and employer stock.  Before target-date funds were added, investors held 
more cash, bonds, and equity funds; afterward, balanced and target-date holdings rose by 22 
percentage points. It is also notable that, before the new target-date funds were introduced, many 
subsequent target-date investors contributed to balanced or static allocation funds; those 
accounted for 58 percent of subsequent pure target-date and 31 percent of mixed target-date 
contributions. These results underscore the importance of controlling on the prior structure of a 
plan’s pre-existing menu design, so as to isolate the novel effect of offering target-date funds on 
participant behavior.  After adopting these funds, pure investors reduced their cash positions  by 
almost 22 percentage points and their US equity holdings by 12 percentage points; for them, 
ownership of balanced and target-date fund funds rose by 42 percentage points.  Mixed investors 
held somewhat more aggressive pre-treatment portfolios, with only nine percent of contributions 
directed to cash and bonds.  Among this latter group, moving into target-date funds resulted in an 
equal reduction in cash, U.S. equity, and company stock positions, but by only just over two 
percentage points. 
Table 5 here 
Table 5 Panel B compares on a pre/post basis, three portfolio attributes for target-date 
fund investors. Overall, the equity share of contributions (the percent of employer and employee 
contributions directed to equities) rose across all investors:26 equity allocations grew from 63 to 
                                                 
26 Equity share is the percentage of employer and employee contributions directed to U.S. and international equity 
funds, company stock, and a percentage of balanced and target-date funds.  The equity percentage for balanced and 
target-date funds was calculated based on each fund’s holdings; it varies from fund to fund. 
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76 percent of contributions, a shift of 13 percentage points. Moreover, this change was most 
pronounced for pure investors, where equity allocations increased by nearly 26 percentage 
points, compared to mixed investors where the increase was just over four percentage points (this 
was because pure investors began with much lower equity allocations than did their mixed 
counterparts). The second column of Panel B reports on a second portfolio characteristic, 
changes in systematic or risk-adjusted expected returns due to target-date fund introduction. A 
given participant’s systematic return is measured as the sum of the risk-free rate over the period, 
fr , and that individual’s factor return, or 
e
tir , , derived from a three-factor asset pricing model.
27  
The third portfolio characteristic in Table 5 refers to the change in the investor’s annualized 
portfolio standard deviation, σ; the fourth is the change in the ratio of idiosyncratic portfolio risk 
as a fraction of total portfolio variance, ./ ,tiTVNSR
28  This last term describes how much of the 
change in portfolio variance is explained by nonsystematic or non-market factors. 
In Table 5 we show that systematic returns rose for both pure and mixed investors 
without controlling on other factors.  It is noteworthy that the resulting change in systematic 
                                                 
27 Factor returns are computed using a three-factor model based on US equities, US bonds, and international equities 
because, as noted earlier, the target-date funds in our dataset are composed of index-based funds mirroring these 
three asset classes.  To calculate portfolio returns we construct a risk-loading matrix for all k investment options in 
our dataset by regressing the excess return (over Treasury bill returns) for each of the k assets in our universe on 
three market indices: the value-weighted CRSP portfolio, the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index (BAB), and the 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Europe, Australia and Far East (EAFE) Index.  Our period of analysis 
is our sample period, 2003-2010, and the five years prior, 1998-2003.  The systematic return for each 401(k) 
investment option is simply its factor exposure times the average factor returns over the period; the participant’s 
factor return is simply the weighted average return of his or her factor exposures over the period. The mean returns 
of our three factors (CRPS, BAB and EAFE) over the 156-month period are given by 
),,( ,,, tMSCIRFtBARFtCRSPRFf rrrr = .  The systematic return associated with the kth asset is its factor exposure times 
the average factor returns over the 96 months, namely fk
e
k rbr
'= .  The ith participant’s excess return reported in 
Panel B of Table 6  is ∑
=
=
N
k
e
ktk
e
i rr
1
,ω , where tki ,,ω  is the weight of the kth fund in the ith participant’s total 
(employer and employee) contributions made in month t.   
 
28 Specifically, .ˆ/ˆ/ , i
idio
itiTVNSR ΣΣ=   We estimate the variance-covariance matrix for all assets Σˆ , which in 
turn is used to estimate the total portfolio variance for the ith participant, iΣˆ .  Df ˆˆˆˆˆ
' +ΒΣΒ=Σ , where Dˆ is a 
diagonal matrix with elements computed as the square of the kεˆ estimated in equation (2).  The asset variance can 
be decomposed into systematic risk, ΒΣΒ=Σ ˆˆˆˆ ' f
sys  and idiosyncratic risk idioDˆ .  Individual portfolio variance is 
then decomposed into its systematic and idiosyncratic components:  
idio
i
sys
itki
idiosys
tkitkitkii D Σ+Σ=+Σ=Σ=Σ ˆˆ)ˆˆ(ˆˆ ,,
'
,,,,
'
,, ωωωω . 
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returns between pure and mixed target-date fund investors is small, despite their markedly 
different initial risk exposures.  For instance, on a “before” basis, those who became mixed 
target-date fund investors held 22 percentage points more equity than those who moved to pure 
target-date fund portfolios (70 versus 50 percent), but their annualized returns differed by only 
25 basis points (5.94 versus 5. 69 percent).  This is a direct reflection of the negative equity risk 
premium that prevailed during the period over which our portfolio characteristics are evaluated 
(1998-2010).29  Portfolio risk levels also increased, though much more for pure than for mixed 
target-date investors.  We also see a drop in idiosyncratic risk, as expected, given the passive 
nature of the target-date fund funds introduced.   
Next, we use a multivariate model of portfolio characteristics to relate these four 
measures – equity share, systematic return, portfolio standard deviation, and nonsystematic risk 
share as a fraction of total variance – to participant, plan and treatment controls.  We estimate 
separate models for pure and for mixed target-date investors.  The four outcomes are represented 
by a vector, PORTFOLIOi,j,t ,  with an estimating equation of the following form:   
TREATMENTβPLANTPARTICIPANPORTFOLIO tji γα ++=,,  
 .,, tjijti εωτυ ++++         (2) 
Model A includes just these terms, while Model B adds interaction terms to test whether specific 
age groups responded differently to the target-date funds treatment. 30   For example, TDF 
_treat*Young allows us to examine the specific impact of target-date fund introduction for 
participants under age 35.    
Table 6 presents estimated coefficients for the portfolio equity share model for pure and 
mixed investors.  The variable TDF_treat in Model A captures the simple change in equity 
allocation after controlling for differences in participant and plan features, timing and industry 
fixed effects, plan design elements, and plan-level heteroskedasticity.  All else constant, pure 
target-date fund investors increased their equity allocation by 20 percentage points, while the 
change for mixed target-date fund investors was only 4 percentage points. Model B adds 
                                                 
29 Average annual returns over this period for the risk-free rate (U.S. Treasury bills) were 2.86%, with 5.96% for 
U.S. bonds (the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index), 4.77% for U.S. stocks (the CRPS value-weighted index), and 
4.82% for international stocks (the MSCI index of non-U.S. stocks).   In other words, during this period the U.S. and 
international equity risk premium were both negative (relative to U.S. bonds). 
30 The models also control for plan-level heteroskedasticity ( iν ), time fixed effects ( tτ ), and industry fixed effects, 
along with missing data dummies. All models also include a financial crisis control. 
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treatment interactions for participant and plan characteristics, the most important of which is 
with respect to age, in view of the age-based equity glide path central to target-date funds.  
Among both pure and mixed target-date fund investors, younger workers (under age 35) invested 
more in equity after target-date funds were introduced (TDF _treat +TDF _treat*Young), 
whereas older investors (over age 55) somewhat reduced their equity share. 
Table 6 here 
Figure 1 reports predicted changes in equity allocations by age (holding all other 
variables at sample means).  Among pure investors younger than age 35, equity allocations rose 
by 41 percentage points when target-date funds were added to the menu; for pure investors age 
35-54, equity allocations increased by 21 percentage points, and for those age 55+, the change 
was only 0.2 percentage points.  In other words, the young-old age gradient steepened by more 
than 40 percentage points for participants switching all of their contributions to target-date funds.  
Among mixed investors, while there was still a change in the age gradient, the relative increase 
was smaller, by about 11 percentage points.31    
It is important to emphasize that these effects occurred solely due to introduction of the 
target-date funds in the 401(k) plan by employers.  Prior to the appearance of target-date funds, 
participants choosing target-date funds could have made similar equity share choices on their 
own.  But they chose not to until the target-date fund “treatment” was introduced by their 
employers, 32  Additionally, these estimates control for default effects, prior preference for 
“prepackaged” portfolios, and, with our difference-in-difference approach, unobservable 
employee traits that might have otherwise influenced these changes.   
Next we consider the three other portfolio efficiency measures.  As depicted in the first 
two columns of Table 7, pure target-date fund investors' expected systematic returns rose by an 
annual 65 basis points as a result of the switch to target-date funds.  Among pure investors under 
age 35, they grew by 91 basis points (68 plus 23 basis points); among pure investors age 55+, by 
46 basis points (68 less 22 basis points).  For mixed target-date fund investors, depicted in the 
next two columns of Table 7, changes were smaller for all mixed investors and by age group.  
Given the negative equity risk premium during our evaluation period, these return differences are 
                                                 
31 Alternatively these differences, which we describe as age-related, could be cohort-related. 
32 Tang, Mitchell, Mottola, and Utkus  (2010) show that virtually all employees could have “rolled their own” 
portfolios to mimic the age-relevant target-date fund mix using funds available prior to the inclusion of the target-
date funds on the menu.  
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likely lower bound estimates of the effects of target-date funds on portfolio returns under normal 
market conditions.   
Table 7 here 
The middle section of Table 7 reports how expected portfolio volatility levels changed 
when participants switched to target-date funds. For pure investors younger than age 35, 
annualized volatility measures rose by 3 percentage points; for pure investors over age 55, they 
remained essentially unchanged. The final section of Table 7 indicates how portfolio 
nonsystematic risk shares changed for participants choosing the funds.  Not surprisingly, there 
was a substantial reduction in nonsystematic risk for pure target-date fund investors as their 
contributions switched to all-indexed target-date funds.  This accounted for 39 percentage points 
of total variance before target-date funds; the marginal effect of shifting to target-date funds was 
a negative 25 percentage points.  The NSR share fell more for younger pure investors (-32 
percentage points) than for older participants (-24 percentage points), and changes for mixed 
target-date fund investors were smaller.   
 
Conclusions and Discussion  
 Since 401(k) plans were first introduced in the US in 1981, one of their distinguishing 
features has been a reliance on individual investment choice – that is, employers assumed 
fiduciary responsibility for selecting fund offerings within 401(k) plans, but individual workers 
remained responsible for portfolio decisions. But research on financial literacy and behavioral 
biases in decision-making have raised concerns that some employees may be unable to make 
effective portfolio choices, thus potentially undermining their old-age financial security. One 
way in which the retirement marketplace has attempted to address this concern has been the 
introduction of target-date funds to 401(k) plans. These target-date funds offer three distinct 
features: a convenience or “prepackaged” aspect, a current portfolio choice based on a simplified 
decision heuristic (expected retirement age), and a commitment device for future age-based 
equity rebalancing.   
Through the growing incidence of these funds, responsibility for portfolio decision-
making has begun to shift away from workers and back to employer.  Demand for target-date 
funds has been influenced by two mechanisms: a  complex default architecture, developed by 
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employers and encouraged by the QDIA regulations of the U.S. Department of Labor, and active 
choice by participants and reliance on the funds as a form of implicit lifecycle advice.   
We seek to disentangle the effects of this complex choice environment using data from a 
natural experiment, namely the introduction and evolution of target-date funds among 401(k) 
plans over the 2003-10 period.  Our analysis considers both adoption patterns, influenced by 
default arrangements or participant active choice, as well as portfolio effects among participants 
actively selecting the funds upon their first appearance in the plan menu.  In terms of adoption, in 
some plans, participants chose the funds based on their own decisions unaffected by any default 
arrangement.  In others, employers designated the target-date funds as a default investment for 
recordkeeping purposes, for new hire automatic enrollment, for reenrollment from a prior default 
fund, for mapping of discontinued funds, or some combination of these.  We show that 
understanding how target-date funds change investor outcomes when added to a plan menu 
depends substantively on the choice architecture in place at the time of their introduction.  
Moreover, ascertaining whether participants who actively choose target-date funds are doing so 
on account of the funds’ glide paths requires controlling for unobservable characteristics that 
might influence their adoption, as well as workers’ preexisting taste for pre-packaged solutions. 
Our difference-in-difference empirical approach addresses these concerns.   
We have three broad findings.  First, there is a latent demand for target-date funds among 
workers based on voluntary choice and this is independent of default effects. New plan entrants 
adopted these funds voluntarily at a (time-weighted) average rate of 31 percent over the 2003-10 
period; existing employees’ take-up rate was roughly half that level. Demand was particularly 
strong among workers early in the lifecycle.  Participants electing target-date funds on their own, 
rather than being defaulted or mapped into them, were equally likely to be pure target-date 
versus mixed target-date fund investors. In other words, preferences for the features of target-
date funds among those making voluntary decisions were not simply a binary, all-or-nothing 
choice. Demand for such funds was also quite resilient to equity market conditions, since active 
adoption of target-date funds increased somewhat during the recent financial crisis. 
Second, default constructs had a potent effect on portfolio outcomes, although the 
magnitude depended on the exact features of the default arrangement.  The simple designation of 
a target-date fund series as a default for administrative or recordkeeping purposes – where 
employees were not directly placed in the new funds – had a “halo” effect on participant 
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outcomes: new plan entrants were 55 percent more likely to hold the funds compared to non-
defaulted new entrants.  As expected from prior research, automatic enrollment of new hires did 
raise target-date adoption: they were 81 percent more likely to elect these funds, compared to an 
“unguided” outcome.  When employers reenrolled participants from a prior default to new target-
date default funds, adoption rates also rose by a similar amount, up 71 percent among new 
entrants. When employers eliminated a fund from the menu and “mapped” participants into 
target-date funds, target-date adoption rose by 166 percent among new entrants, and more than 
doubled among existing employees.   
Third, among participants actively switching to target-date funds when they were first 
introduced, a difference-in-difference analysis confirms that the introduction of the funds in the 
plan menu resulted in sizeable changes in portfolio characteristics.  Particularly notable was the 
large steepening of the age-equity allocation gradient, with workers younger than age 35 
experiencing a 40 percent point rise in equity share; participants age 35-55 experiencing a 21 
percent point increase; and no change seen for participants age 55+.  Nonsystematic risk shares 
also fell markedly for target-date investors of all ages. Further, we showed that systematic 
returns and portfolio variance increased, particularly for younger investors. These changes in 
portfolio characteristics occurred as a result of the introduction of target-date funds by the 
employer, despite the fact that participants could have adopted these changes on their own before 
the target-date funds appeared.  
These effects provide evidence of participant demand for employer-selected investment 
advice implicit in the funds’ glide paths (with the term “advice” here used in a practical, rather 
than a legal sense).  Our findings are robust to controls for default effects, observable plan and 
participant differences, pre-existing tastes for prepackaged investment programs, and 
unobservable individual characteristics.33 We conclude that responsibility for portfolio decisions 
is gradually shifting away from workers to employers through the growth of target-date funds in 
401(k) plans.  In default arrangements, this effect is direct: account contributions are invested in 
target-date funds at the explicit direction of the employer. When participants actively choose the 
funds, this effect is indirect: many participants adopt quite different allocations in response to the 
                                                 
33 Thus far we cannot determine whether this was mainly due to workers favoring the simplified decision heuristic 
(expected retirement age) associated with the current portfolio choice, or a preference for the commitment device for 
future age-based rebalancing, or some combination of both.   
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introduction of the target-date equity glide paths into the plan menu.  Regardless of the decision-
making mechanism, many retirement plan investors appear to have malleable or ambiguous 
preferences for portfolio choice, because of lack of financial knowledge and experience, 
behavioral biases, or other reasons. 
Our results also have implications for household finance more broadly. Households seem 
particularly willing to rely on default or simplified advice arrangements when facing complex 
and consequential financial choices. Inertia, too, is a dominant heuristic, not only in saving 
behavior but in portfolio allocation decisions. Policy prescriptions in such instances might 
include not only default arrangements, but also programs or services that offer simplifying 
choices and/or embedded advice. An important question for future research is whether such 
design principles can also inform household decisions of consequence in other domains, 
including the choice of health insurance plans, taxable saving and investments, mortgage 
instruments, and insurance.  
 
References 
Agnew, Julie, Pierluigi Balduzzi, and Annika Sunden. 2003. “Portfolio Choice and Trading in a Large 
401(k) Plan,” American Economic Review, 93(1): 193-215. 
Agnew, Julie, Lisa Szykman, Stephen P. Utkus and Jean A. Young.  2011.  “What People Know About 
Target-Date Funds: Survey and Focus Group Evidence.”   CRR Working Paper. 
Ameriks, John, Dean J. Hamilton and Liqian Ren. 2011.  “Investor  comprehension and usage of target-
date funds: 2010 survey.”  Vanguard Investment Counseling and Research, Malvern, PA.   
Ameriks, John and Stephen Zeldes. 2001.  “How Do Household Portfolio Shares Vary with Age?”  
TIAA-CREF Institute Working Paper 6-120101.  
Barber, Brad and Terry Odean. 2001. “Boys will be Boys: Gender, Overconfidence, and Common Stock 
Investment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics. 116(1): 261-292. 
Benartzi, Shlomo. 2001.  “Excessive Extrapolation and the Allocation of 401(k) Accounts to Company 
Stock.”  Journal of Finance.  October.  56(5): 1747-1764. 
Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler. 2001.  “Naïve Diversification Strategies in Defined 
Contribution Savings Plans.”  American Economic Review.    March.  91(1): 79-98. 
Benartzi, Shlomo and Richard H. Thaler.  2002.  "How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth?"   Journal of 
Finance.  August.  57(4):  1593-1616. 
Benartzi, Shlomo, Ehud Peleg, and Richard H. Thaler.  2007.  "Choice Architecture and Retirement 
Savings Plans.”  SSRN Working Paper. July.  
23 
 
 
Brown, Jeffrey R., Nellie Lang and Scott Weisbenner.  2007. “Individual Account Investment Options 
and Portfolio Choice: Behavioral Lessons from 401(k) Plans.” Journal of Public Economics. 
91(10): 1992 – 2013. 
Calvet, Laurent E., John Y. Campbell, and Paolo Sodini.  2009.  “Fight or Flight?  Portfolio Rebalancing 
by Individual Investors.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics.  124: 301-348. 
Carroll, Gabriel D., James J. Choi, David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick. 2009.  
“Optimal Defaults and Active Decisions.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 124(4): 1639-1674. 
Choi, James J., David Laibson, and Brigitte C. Madrian. 2004.  "Plan Design and 401(k) Savings 
Outcomes." National Tax Journal.  57 (2): 275-298.   
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick. 2003.  "Optimal Defaults."  
American Economic Review.  93 (2): 180-185.   
Choi, James J., David Laibson, Brigitte C. Madrian, and Andrew Metrick. 2006.  “Saving for Retirement 
on the Path of Least Resistance.” In Behavioral Public Finance: Toward a New Agenda, Ed 
McCaffrey and Joel Slemrod, eds. New York: Russell Sage Foundation: 304-351.    
Copeland, Craig.  2011.  “Target-Date Fund Use in 401(k) Plans and the Persistence of their Use 2007-
2009.”  Washington: Employee Benefits Research Institute.  Issue Brief No. 361, August.   
Holden, Sarah, Jack VanDerhei, Luis Alonso, and Steven Bass. 2011. “401(k) Plan Asset Allocation, 
Account Balances, and Loan Activity in 2010.” ICI Research Perspective 17, no. 10 (December). 
Huberman, Gur and Wei Jiang.  2006.  “Offering vs. Choices in 401(k) Plans: Equity Exposure and 
Number of Funds.”  Journal of Finance.  41 (2): 763-801.   
ICI, 2011.   2011 Investment Company Fact Book.  51st edition.  Washington, DC.: Investment Company 
Institute.   
Iyengar, Sheena, Gur Huberman and Wei Jiang.  2004.  “How Much Choice is Too Much?  Contributions 
to 401(k) Retirement Plans.”  In Pension Design and Structure: New Lessons from Behavioral 
Finance, Olivia S. Mitchell and Stephen P. Utkus, eds.  Oxford: Oxford University Press: 83-96. 
Iyengar, Sheena, and Emir Kamenica. 2010.  “Choice Proliferation, Simplicity Seeking and Asset 
Allocation.”  Journal of Public Economics.  94(7-8). 530-539. 
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia S. Mitchell.  2007.  “Baby Boomer Retirement Security: The Role of 
Planning, Financial Literacy and Housing Health.  Journal of Monetary Economics. 54(1) 
January: 205-224. 
Lusardi, Annamaria and Olivia S. Mitchell.  2011.  “Financial Literacy and Retirement Planning in the 
United States.”  Journal of Pension Economics & Finance. 10(4): 509-525. 
Madrian, Brigitte, and D.F. Shea. 2001.  “The Power of Suggestion: Inertia in 401(k) Participation and 
Savings Behavior.”  Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 (4 ): 1149-1525. 
24 
 
 
Mitchell, Olivia S. and Annamaria Lusardi, eds. 2011. Financial Literacy:  Implications for Retirement 
Security and the Financial Marketplace. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Mitchell, Olivia S., Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus, and Takeshi Yamaguchi. 2006a. “The Inattentive 
Participant: Portfolio Trading Behavior in 401(k) Plans.”  Pension Research Council Working 
Paper 2006-05.  Philadelphia, PA.: Wharton School.     
Mitchell, Olivia S., Gary R. Mottola, Stephen P. Utkus and Takeshi Yamaguchi. 2006b. “Winners and 
Losers: 401(k) Trading and Portfolio Performance.”  Pension Research Council Working Paper 
2006-26.  Philadelphia, PA.: Wharton School.   
Mottola, Gary R. and Stephen P. Utkus.  2008.  “Red, Yellow and Green: Measuring the Quality of 
401(k) Portfolio Choices.”  In Overcoming the Savings Slump: How to Increase the Effectiveness 
of Financial Education and Saving Programs, Annamaria Lusardi, ed.  Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press:  199-139.  
Mottola, Gary R. and Stephen P. Utkus.  2009.  “Reenrollment and Target-date Funds: A Case Study in 
Portfolio Reconstruction.”  Vanguard Center for Retirement Research, Malvern, PA.    
Nessmith, William E., Stephen P. Utkus, and Jean A. Young.   2007.  "Measuring the Effectiveness of 
Automatic Enrollment."  Vanguard Center for Retirement Research, Malvern, PA.     
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin. 1999. “Procrastination in Preparing for Retirement.” In Henry 
Aaron, ed., Behavioral Dimensions of Retirement Economics.  Washington, D.C.: Brookings 
Institution Press and Russell Sage Foundation: 125-156. 
O’Donoghue, Ted, and Matthew Rabin.  2001.  “Choice and Procrastination.” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics. 116(1): 121-160. 
Pagliaro, Cynthia A. and Stephen P. Utkus.  2011.  “Mixed target-date investors in defined contribution 
plans.”  Malvern: Vanguard Center for Retirement Research.   
Park, Youngkyun.  2009.  “Investment Behavior of Target-Date Fund Users Having Other Funds in 
401(k) Accounts.”  EBRI Notes.  30(12). Washington: Employee Benefits Research Institute.    
Samwick, Andrew A., and Jonathan Skinner. 2004. "How Will 401(k) Pension Plans Affect Retirement 
Income?" American Economic Review, 94(1): 329–343. 
Tang, Ning, Olivia S. Mitchell, Gary R. Mottola, and Stephen P. Utkus. 2010. “The Efficiency of Sponsor 
and Participant Portfolio Choices in 401(k) Plans.” Journal of Public Economics. 94(11-12): 
1073-1085. 
Thaler, Richard and Cass Sunstein. 2008. Nudge: Improving Decisions About Health, Wealth, and 
Happiness. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Vanguard. 2008.  Improving Plan Diversification Through Reenrollment in a QDIA.  Malvern: Vanguard 
Strategic Retirement Consulting.  institutional.vanguard.com.    
25 
 
 
Vanguard, 2011. How America Saves 2011: A Report on Vanguard 2010 Defined Contribution Plan 
Data.  Malvern: Vanguard Center for Retirement Research.      
26 
 
 
Table 1.  Target-Date Fund Characteristics 
 
 
 
B.  Introduction of Target-Date Funds to 401(k) Plans         
 
 
 
   Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
 
A.  Portfolio Allocation for Target-Date Funds by Specified Target Year
Date of Fund
U.S. 
stocks 
(%)
Non-U.S. 
stocks (%)
U.S. nominal 
bonds (%)
U.S. inflation-
protected 
bonds (%) Cash (%)
2055 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2050 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2045 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2040 63.0 27.0 10.0 0.0 0.0
2035 62.5 26.8 10.8 0.0 0.0
2030 57.2 24.5 18.3 0.0 0.0
2025 52.0 22.3 25.8 0.0 0.0
2020 46.7 20.0 33.3 0.0 0.0
2015 41.3 17.7 40.0 1.0 0.0
2010 34.0 14.6 40.4 10.7 0.4
2005 24.0 10.3 43.9 17.9 3.9
Income 21.0 9.0 45.0 20.0 5.0
Note: As of December 31, 2010.
N % N* % N** %
Plan introduced target-date funds de 
novo 475 47 1,058,189 48 39,550 24
Plan added target-date funds to static 
allocation (SA) funds 211 21 509,740 23 8,666 5
Plan switched from static allocation (SA) 
funds to target-date funds 322 32 634,482 29 115,220 71
Total 1,008       2,202,411 163,436
Notes:
*Unique accounts over the 2003-2010 period in the full sample, including target-date non-adopters and adopters; 
**Unique target-date adopter accounts over the 2003-2010 period in the difference-in-difference sample.
Full sample
Difference-in-difference 
sample
Plans Accounts Target-date fund adopters
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Table 2.  Descriptive Characteristics: Plans and Participants 
 
Full sample Difference-in-difference
sample
All 
Pure TDF 
Investors
Mixed TDF 
Investors
All TDF 
Investors
Pure 
Investors
Mixed TDF 
Investors
Default architecture (%)
Default 80.1 91.3 85.9 61.9 67.4 57.8
New-hire auto enrollment 48.3 60.5 45.2 40.4 53.7 30.6
Reenrollment 1.5 3.9 0.2 2.9 6.6 0.1
Mapping 4.4 5.2 17.9 24.9 18.1 29.9
Other plan features (%)
N Funds offered (mean) 28.7 28.4 25.7 23.8 23.5 24.0
Employer stock offered 45.0 42.1 56.1 50.8 39.4 59.2
Loan offered 85.5 85.1 92.5 90.0 85.2 93.4
SA_before 52.0 57.5 53.7 75.8 78.4 73.9
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$) 9.7 8.4 10.2 10.2 9.7 10.5
New entrants (%) 42.6 78.3 42.7 N/A N/A N/A
Job tenure (years) 9.4 5.1 9.1 8.6 7.3 9.5
Young (<35, %) 25.3 39.3 26.1 28.7 33.4 25.3
Middle (35-55, %) 55.4 49.0 57.8 57.6 53.3 60.8
Old (>55, %) 19.2 11.6 16.1 13.7 13.3 14.0
Male (%) 56.2 54.0 57.8 53.1 50.0 55.3
HH income low (<$62.5K, %) 21.7 22.9 19.4 21.9 25.3 19.4
HH income medium ($62.5-$87.5K, %) 39.9 50.2 37.5 39.0 41.0 37.5
HH income high (>$87.5K) 38.4 26.8 43.1 39.1 33.7 43.1
Non-ret. financial wealth
Low (<$7.3K, %) 43.5 50.7 41.2 45.1 49.2 42.1
Average ($7.3K-$61.2K, %) 35.5 33.5 37.2 35.6 33.8 37.0
High (>$61.2K, %) 21.0 15.8 21.6 19.3 17.1 20.9
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year) 5.7 6.1 5.3 15.1 20.3 11.3
TDF adoption (account %)
TDF investor 41.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Pure TDF investor 29.6 100.0 0.0 42.3 100.0 0.0
Mixed TDF investor 11.8 0.0 100.0 57.7 0.0 100.0
Observations
N plans 1,008 996 982 940 857 849
N accounts 2,202,411 651,396 259,393 163,436 69,148 94,288
Note: For the 2003-2010 summary of the full sample, characteristics are measured as of the final contribution
date between 2003 and 2010, including new entrants.  For the difference-in-difference sample, characteristics 
are measured six months after target-date fund introduction.  Each observation represents one account.
See text for variable definitions.
Source: Authors' tabulations.
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Table 3.  Determinants of Participant Target-Date Fund Adoption Patterns (full sample) 
 
 
Variable 
Mean
Marginal 
Effect (%)
Default architecture (%)
Default (%) 62.6         0.204 *** 6.6 0.013 *** 3.6 *** 4.4 ***
New entrant*Default 23.1         0.250 *** 8.6 0.160 *** 6.4 *** 1.0 ***
Mos since TDF 28.8         0.017 *** 0.6 0.003 *** 0.3 *** 0.4 ***
Mos**2 since TDF/1,000 1.2           -0.119 *** -10.8 -0.018 *** -6.1 *** -5.5 ***
New-hire auto enrollment 40.4         0.109 *** 3.6 0.014 *** 1.4 *** 1.9 ***
New-hire auto enrollment*Default 33.7         -0.073 *** -2.4 0.019 *** 4.8 *** -4.7 ***
New-hire auto enrollment*Default*New entrant 14.0         0.290 *** 10.1 0.080 *** 2.0 *** 3.2 ***
New-hire auto enrollment*New entrant 15.9         -0.127 *** -4.1 0.017 *** 1.0 *** -4.5 ***
Reenrollment 0.7           0.573 *** 21.4 0.303 *** 35.1 *** -8.1 ***
Mapping 2.9           1.459 *** 53.3 0.208 *** 34.5 *** 55.4 ***
Other plan characteristics (%)
N Funds offered (mean) 29.3         -0.014 *** -0.5 -0.003 *** -0.3 *** -0.3 ***
Employer stock offered 45.5         -0.015 *** -0.5 -0.028 *** -4.2 *** 3.1 ***
Loan offered 82.7         0.023 *** 0.8 -0.012 *** -3.0 *** 3.0 ***
SA_before 49.2         0.445 *** 14.7 0.097 *** 10.1 *** 6.8 ***
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$) 10.0         -0.126 *** -5.2 -0.048 *** -4.9 *** 0.8 ***
New entrant 32.5         0.597 *** 20.7 0.117 *** 15.9 *** 12.0 ***
Job tenure (years) 9.9           -0.008 *** -0.3 -0.001 *** -0.2 *** -0.2 ***
Young (<35, %) 22.8         0.132 *** 4.5 0.027 *** 2.1 *** 3.4 ***
Old (>55, %) 17.1         -0.052 *** -1.7 0.003 *** 0.1 -2.1 ***
Male (%) 55.6         0.030 *** 1.0 0.007 *** 0.3 *** 0.5 ***
HH income low (<$62.5K, %) 21.7         -0.024 *** -0.8 -0.001 *** 0.1 ** -1.0 ***
HH income high (>$87.5K, %) 40.3         0.014 *** 0.5 0.006 *** -0.2 ** 0.1 *
Wealth low (<$7.3K, %) 42.2         0.000 0.0 0.003 *** 0.5 *** -0.3 ***
Wealth high (>$61.2K, %) 21.8         -0.017 *** -0.6 0.003 *** -0.5 *** -0.6 ***
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year) 13.3         0.045 *** 1.5 0.010 *** 1.1 *** 0.8 ***
Controls
Account clustering
Time fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations
Number of clusters (accounts)
-2LogL
Pseudo-R squared / R-squared
Notes: ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level. All regressions include time and industry fixed effects.
Probit and logit models include clustered standard errors at the account level. For variable definitions see text.  Source: Authors' computations.
Prob Pure Investor
(Mean = 20.1%)
C: Multinomial Logit
Prob Mixed Investor
(Mean = 11.1%)
A: Probit
Prob. of TDF adoption
(Mean = 31.2%)
B: OLS
Contributions to TDFs
(Mean = 24.1%)
76,834,887
34.3%
No
Yes
Yes
62,553,961
N/A
N/A
33.8%
Yes
Yes
Yes
62,553,961
2,202,411
Yes
Yes
58,279,029
26.7%
Yes
62,553,961
2,202,411
Marginal Effect (%) Marginal Effect (%)Coefficient Coefficient
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Table 4. Plan Choice Architecture: Summary of Predicted Effects on 
Employee Outcomes (full sample) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
  
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Prob. of TDF 
adoption (%)
Total 
Contributions 
to TDF
Prob. of Pure 
TDF (%)
Prob of 
Mixed TDF 
(%)
Sample mean 31.2 24.1 20.1 11.1
I.  Active choice 
A.  New entrants 31.4 24.0 15.9 16.9
B.  Existing participants 14.0 12.3 5.6 6.9
II  Indirect default 
A.  New entrants 48.8 41.3 29.9 26.0
B.  Existing participants 19.0 13.6 7.5 10.4
III.  Direct default to target-date fund
A.  New entrants 56.7 54.3 47.7 17.3
B.  Existing participants     
IV.  Reenrollment to target-date fund
A.  New entrants 53.6 54.4 65.6 6.0
B.  Existing participants 30.6 42.6 33.0 3.2
V.  Mapping to target-date fund
A.  New entrants 83.5 44.8 53.5 76.6
B.  Existing participants 64.7 33.1 26.4 54.6
Source: Predicted effects derived from models in Tables 3 (probability of adoption, employee contributions,
and pure versus mixed TDF adopters).  "New entrants" are participants who enrolled with TDFs offered in the
investment menu; "existing participants" are participants who enrolled prior to TDFs being introduced in the
menu. For definitions of default categories, see text.
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 Table 5.  Pre/Post Contribution Allocations and Portfolio Characteristics  
(Difference-in-difference sample) 
 
 
 
  
Source: Authors’ computations. 
 
 
A. Contribution Allocation (%)
Cash Bonds
Balanced/ 
TDF
U.S. 
Equities
International 
Equities
Company 
Stock
All TDF Pre 14.5 6.5 42.1 26.4 5.3 5.3
investors Post 4.0 4.0 63.6 20.1 5.0 3.3
Change -10.6 -2.5 21.5 -6.3 -0.2 -2.0
Pure TDF Pre 21.8 5.7 57.6 12.0 1.4 1.5
investors Post 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Change -21.8 -5.7 42.4 -12.0 -1.4 -1.5
Mixed TDF Pre 9.2 7.2 30.7 36.9 8.0 8.0
investors Post 6.9 7.0 36.9 34.8 8.7 5.7
Change -2.3 -0.1 6.2 -2.0 0.6 -2.3
B. Portfolio Risk/Return Characteristics  (%)
Equity 
Allocations
Systematic 
Returns
Portfolio 
risk (σ) NSR/TV
All TDF Pre 62.5 5.84 0.11 31.7
investors Post 75.8 6.32 0.12 12.2
Change 13.4 0.48 0.01 -19.5
Pure TDF Pre 49.5 5.69 0.09 38.9
investors Post 75.1 6.54 0.12 5.5
Change 25.7 0.86 0.03 -33.3
Mixed TDF Pre 72.0 5.94 0.12 26.5
investors Post 76.3 6.16 0.13 17.1
Change 4.4 0.21 0.01 -9.4
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Table 6.  Determinants of the Share of Participant Portfolios in Equity  
(OLS coefficients; difference-in-difference sample) 
 
 
 
     Source: Authors’ computations. 
Default architecture (%)
New-hire auto enrollment 0.014 *** 0.013 *** 0.001 0.000
Reenrollment 0.047 *** 0.046 *** -0.195 *** -0.195 ***
Mapping 0.075 *** 0.092 *** 0.001 0.003 *
Treatment
TDF_treat 0.195 *** 0.173 *** 0.042 *** 0.040 ***
TDF_treat*Young 0.145 *** 0.041 ***
TDF_treat*Old -0.198 *** -0.064 ***
TDF_treat*Low_income -0.009 *** 0.000
TDF_treat*High_income -0.037 *** -0.006 ***
TDF_treat*Male 0.005 *** -0.003 ***
TDF_treat*Poor_wealth 0.026 *** 0.006 ***
TDF_treat*Rich_wealth -0.017 *** 0.006 ***
Other plan features (%)
N funds offered (mean) -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.000
Employer stock offered -0.088 *** -0.089 *** 0.037 *** 0.037 ***
Loan offered 0.073 *** 0.073 *** 0.004 0.004
SA_before 0.005 *** 0.004 ** 0.027 *** 0.026 ***
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$) 0.019 *** 0.017 *** 0.023 *** 0.023 ***
Job tenure (years) -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.003 *** -0.003 ***
Young (<35, %) 0.028 *** -0.044 *** 0.034 *** 0.014 ***
Old (>55, %) -0.106 *** -0.001 -0.094 *** -0.061 ***
Male (%) 0.003 ** 0.002 0.025 *** 0.026 ***
HH income low (<$62.5K, %) -0.005 *** 0.000 -0.012 *** -0.012 ***
HH income high (>$87.5K, %) -0.002 0.019 *** 0.005 *** 0.008 ***
Wealth low (<$7.3K, %) -0.003 *** -0.017 *** -0.009 *** -0.012 ***
Wealth high (>$61.2K, %) -0.001 0.008 *** 0.003 * 0.000
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year) 0.159 *** 0.138 *** 0.040 *** 0.037 ***
Controls
Account level cluster
Time fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations
Accounts
R squared
Dependent means
Pre-treat
Post-treat
Unadjusted difference
Note: Separate OLS difference-in-difference models for pure versus mixed adopters.  
Independent variable characteristics are described in Table 2; dependent variable means are 
as shown at bottom of each column.  Models include account-level clustering and time and industry
fixed effects.  ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level.
75.1%
25.6%
72.0%
76.3%
4.4%
49.5%
138,296
69,148
41.7%
138,296
69,148
46.5%
188,576 188,576
94,288 94,288
9.8%9.2%
Mixed TDF Investors
Yes
Yes
Yes
Model A Model B
Pure TDF Investors
Model DModel C
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Table 7.  Marginal Effects of Portfolio Characteristics and Target-Date Fund Treatment (OLS ; difference-in-difference 
sample) 
 
Default architecture (%)
New-hire auto enrollment 0.0053 *** 0.0052 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0030 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** -0.2069 *** -0.2065 *** 0.0275 *** 0.0269 ***
Reenrollment 0.0017 *** 0.0017 *** -0.0095 *** -0.0095 *** 0.0043 *** 0.0041 *** -0.0320 *** -0.0320 *** -0.0766 *** -0.0763 *** 0.1714 *** 0.1719 ***
Mapping 0.0014 *** 0.0016 *** 0.0021 *** 0.0021 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0008 *** 0.0034 *** 0.0035 *** -0.0454 *** -0.0507 *** -0.0386 *** -0.0406 ***
Treatment
TDF_treat 0.0065 *** 0.0068 *** 0.0022 *** 0.0026 *** 0.0201 *** 0.0136 *** 0.0081 *** 0.0079 *** -0.2450 *** -0.2363 *** -0.0831 *** -0.0582 ***
TDF_treat*Young 0.0023 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0179 *** 0.0034 *** -0.0860 *** -0.0199 ***
TDF_treat*Old -0.0022 *** -0.0008 *** -0.0135 *** -0.0041 *** -0.0016 -0.0164 ***
TDF_treat*Low_income -0.0002 ** -0.0002 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0000 0.0223 *** -0.0074 *
TDF_treat*High_income -0.0007 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0039 *** -0.0011 *** 0.0440 *** 0.0113 ***
TDF_treat*Male -0.0005 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0024 *** -0.0002 *** 0.0064 ** -0.0128 ***
TDF_treat*Poor_wealth 0.0005 *** -0.0001 0.0032 *** 0.0009 *** -0.0181 *** -0.0155 ***
TDF_treat*Rich_wealth -0.0004 *** 0.0002 ** -0.0017 *** 0.0003 -0.0022 -0.0036
TDF_treat*Young*FinancialCrisis 0.0015 *** 0.0001 0.0013 *** 0.0011 *** 0.0069 *** -0.0034 *** 0.0054 *** 0.0036 *** -0.0022 0.0495 *** 0.0969 *** 0.1049 ***
TDF_treat*Old*FinancialCrisis -0.0021 *** -0.0008 *** 0.0000 0.0005 ** -0.0114 *** -0.0036 *** -0.0051 *** -0.0028 ** 0.0709 *** 0.0672 *** 0.1065 *** 0.1106 ***
Other plan features (%)
N funds offered (mean) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** 0.0005 *** 0.0005 *** -0.0031 *** -0.0033 ***
Employer stock offered -0.0046 *** -0.0045 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0006 *** -0.0070 *** -0.0069 *** 0.0056 *** 0.0056 *** 0.2960 *** 0.2951 0.1464 *** 0.1473 ***
Loan offered 0.0019 *** 0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0019 *** 0.0098 *** 0.0101 *** -0.0008 * -0.0007 -0.0631 *** -0.0634 *** -0.0175 *** -0.0183 ***
SA_before -0.0003 *** -0.0003 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0013 *** -0.0003 -0.0001 0.0045 *** 0.0045 *** -0.1259 *** -0.1265 *** -0.0439 *** -0.0434 ***
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$) 0.0003 *** 0.0003 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0030 *** 0.0027 *** 0.0033 *** 0.0033 *** -0.0234 *** -0.0223 *** -0.0129 *** -0.0124 ***
Job tenure (years) 0.0000 *** 0.0000 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** 0.0000 *** 0.0000 -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0005 ** -0.0006 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 ***
Young (<35, %) -0.0004 *** -0.0013 *** 0.0004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0013 *** -0.0063 *** 0.0044 *** 0.0029 *** 0.0472 *** 0.0839 *** -0.0082 *** 0.0012
Old (>55, %) -0.0015 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0010 *** -0.0117 *** -0.0051 *** -0.0139 *** -0.0119 *** -0.0061 -0.0058 0.0068 ** 0.0149 ***
Male (%) 0.0004 *** 0.0006 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0013 *** 0.0001 0.0048 *** 0.0049 *** -0.0185 *** -0.0218 *** 0.0025 0.0089 ***
HH income low (<$62.5K, %) -0.0001 * 0.0000 -0.0003 *** -0.0002 ** -0.0009 *** -0.0024 *** -0.0014 *** -0.0014 *** 0.0106 *** -0.0009 0.0046 0.0083 *
HH income high (>$87.5K, %) 0.0000 0.0004 *** 0.0002 *** 0.0004 *** -0.0001 0.0021 *** 0.0008 *** 0.0014 *** -0.0040 -0.0277 *** 0.0005 -0.0055
Wealth low (<$7.3K, %) -0.0002 *** -0.0005 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0004 *** -0.0009 *** -0.0025 *** -0.0018 *** -0.0023 *** 0.0127 *** 0.0219 *** 0.0033 0.0111 ***
Wealth high (>$61.2K, %) 0.0000 0.0002 * 0.0001 ** 0.0000 0.0003 0.0012 ** 0.0007 *** 0.0006 0.0024 0.0034 0.0049 ** 0.0065 *
Financial crisis
Financial crisis (% of year) 0.0041 *** 0.0041 *** -0.0012 *** -0.0012 *** 0.0144 *** 0.0154 *** -0.0019 *** -0.0020 *** -0.2005 *** -0.2029 *** -0.0335 *** -0.0354 ***
Controls
Account level cluster
Time fixed effects
Industry fixed effects
Observations 138,296 188,576 188,576 138,296 188,576 188,576 138,296 188,576 188,576
Accounts 69,148 94,288 94,288 69,148 94,288 94,288 69,148 94,288 94,288
R squared 46.5% 8.1% 8.2% 25.4% 28.0% 6.6% 6.7% 33.2% 33.4% 11.3% 11.4%
Dependent means
Pre-treat
Post-treat
Unadjusted difference
Note: Separate OLS difference-in-difference models for pure versus mixed adopters.  Independent variable characteristics are described in Table 2; dependent variable means are as shown at bottom of
each column and in Table 8.  Models include account-level clustering and time and industry fixed effects.  ** Significant at 0.05 level, *** Significant at 0.01 level.  Source: Authors' computations.
Annualized returns Annualized standard deviation (σ) Nonsystematic risk/Total variance (NSR/TV)
Pure TDF Investors Mixed TDF Investors Pure TDF Investors Mixed TDF Investors Pure TDF Investors Mixed TDF Investors
Model DModel A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C Model D Model A Model B Model C
Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes
26.49%
Yes Yes Yes
138,296
69,148
45.9%
5.69% 5.94% 0.09 0.12 38.86%
138,296
69,148
138,296
69,148
-9.43%
6.54% 6.16% 0.12 0.13 5.55% 17.06%
0.85% 0.22% 0.03 0.01 -33.31%
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Figure 1.  Change in Participant Portfolio Equity Shares: Post Minus Pre 
Target-Date Fund Introduction (Difference-in-difference sample) 
 
 
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
 
Figure 2.  Equity Share of Participant Portfolios for Target-date Fund 
Investors: Pre and Post TDF Adoption (Difference-in-difference sample) 
 
 
Source: Authors’ tabulations. 
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For Online Publication: Data Appendix: Plan and Participant 
Characteristics by Year and for Entire Study Period  
(Full sample) 
 
 
Entire 
Period
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2003-10
Default architecture  (%)
Default 0.0 6.1 6.5 20.2 22.3 73.9 86.9 89.6 80.1
New-hire auto enrollment 0.0 2.9 5.2 27.2 33.5 44.1 49.1 51.3 48.3
Reenrollment 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.8 1.6 1.5
Mapping 0.0 0.6 0.6 1.1 2.3 3.2 3.7 5.3 4.4
Other plan characteristics (%)
N funds offered (mean) 65.8 45.5 30.3 27.7 28.2 28.3 28.6 29.3 28.7
Employer stock offered 0.0 15.5 38.5 45.0 46.9 46.8 46.7 44.5 45.0
Loan offered 3.5 44.2 70.5 79.9 84.6 85.2 85.8 85.5 85.5
SA_before 100.0 70.8 43.8 37.0 44.3 50.4 54.2 55.0 52.0
Participant characteristics
Log balance (mean 2010$) 9.9 9.9 10.1 10.0 10.0 9.6 9.9 10.1 9.7
New entrant (%) 1.6 8.9 13.5 22.8 28.3 35.9 40.5 43.6 42.6
Job tenure (years) 4.7 7.6 9.8 9.3 9.3 9.4 9.8 10.2 9.4
Young (<35, %) 23.6 24.8 24.2 24.8 24.4 24.4 23.0 22.4 25.3
Middle (35-55, %) 63.7 61.5 60.9 59.7 59.9 58.4 58.3 57.8 55.4
Old (>55, %) 12.7 13.7 14.9 15.5 15.7 17.2 18.7 19.7 19.2
Male (%) 34.7 39.7 43.0 53.9 57.9 56.7 57.1 57.6 56.2
HH income low (<$62.5K, %) 18.5 20.4 19.4 23.3 23.4 23.3 22.0 21.0 21.7
HH income medium ($62.5-$87.5K, %) 35.5 43.9 41.3 36.8 37.4 37.1 37.6 38.0 39.9
HH income high (>$87.5K) 46.1 35.7 39.3 39.9 39.2 39.6 40.4 41.0 38.4
Non-ret. Financial Wealth
Low (<$7.3K, %) 9.5 38.1 43.6 43.7 42.3 42.5 44.6 42.1 43.5
Average ($7.3K-$61.2K, %) 43.6 35.1 34.7 34.9 34.2 34.2 35.4 36.4 35.5
High (>$61.2K, %) 46.9 26.8 21.8 21.4 23.5 23.2 19.9 21.6 21.0
Financial Crisis
Financial crisis (% of year) 0 0 0 0 0 1/3 1/3 0 5.7
TDF adoption (% of accounts)
TDF investor 0.2 4.8 14.9 19.5 25.9 35.2 39.4 44.0 41.4
Pure TDF investor 0.1 2.8 7.2 10.8 15.5 23.7 27.4 31.5 29.6
Mixed TDF investor 0.0 2.0 7.7 8.7 10.4 11.5 12.0 12.5 11.8
Observations
N plans 7 136 287 485 716 879 966 1,008 1,008
N accounts 10,150 142,130 380,325 679,188 1,137,428 1,487,507 1,556,295 1,543,320 2,202,411
Note: In individual years 2003 through 2010, characteristics are measured as of final contribution date in each calendar year for full sample
including new entrants; each observation represents one account.  In 2003-2010 summary, characteristics are measured as of
the contribution date for the full sample including new entrants; each observation represents one account.  
Source: Authors' computations.
By Year
